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About this note 
Brunel University London is preparing funding proposals to support a multi-disciplinary study 
to identify new critical success factors for major projects within the UK government involving 
information (or “digital”) technologies, by interpreting them as political interventions rather 
than rationalisable IT developments or institutional changes. This study is timely as two 
independent reports on recent project failures illustrate how changes to the high-level 
governance and management of such projects introduced since 2010 have significantly 
increased the risk of failure, rather than reduce it as intended. This note sets out an analysis 
of these reports as a preliminary step that illustrates the urgency and importance of resetting 
the project control system around factors that improve the chances of success. It concludes by 
proposing objectives for such a study. 
Brunel University London, October 2016. Licence: CC BY. 
 
 
Introduction 
Research into the causes of failure of government projects involving information technology 
(IT) has typically applied lenses derived from private sector practice or regarded them as IT 
projects, when in fact they are complex implementations of government policy carried out in a 
political setting. In the last decade, no research has attempted to systematically study the 
interrelationships and dependencies between the critical success factors (CSFs) that make such 
projects successful. Rather, much of the attention has been on failure. Further, as regards the 
UK, little attention has yet been given to analysing the impact of changes introduced since 2010 
in comparison with the pre-2010 period. 
Two government projects involving IT (or “digital”) have been studied in depth this year 
(2016) by independent institutions. These studies reveal issues about the management of such 
projects within central government that are systemic and extend beyond these individual cases. 
Many of the problematic issues relate to interventions introduced by the Cabinet Office after 
2010 that were intended to improve the execution of such projects but in fact made matters 
worse. The Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee (PAC) investigated the implementation 
of a system for calculating EU-funded subsidies to farmers (CAP-D) [1], and the Institute for 
Government published an analysis of the programme to reform the welfare benefits system 
(Universal Credit, UC) [2].  
Prior to 2010, several decades of learning about how to manage policy implementation projects 
and IT had evolved into a complex system of interconnected processes, notably but not 
exclusively the Gateway review processes from 2000 onwards. This note concludes that while 
it was of course not perfect, nor always perfectly implemented, a number of changes made to 
parts of the system out of context of the whole, has damaged its effectiveness. Many stemmed 
from the dominance of the discourse around “digital”. Therefore, it is necessary to reassess 
how to improve the current situation, and this conclusion is part of the supporting argument for 
Brunel’s proposed research. 
 
Method of this prior analysis of secondary sources 
This conclusion is reached by drawing on five interconnected aspects of managing large 
projects that involve IT, to which many of the processes concerned relate, and using them as 
lenses to inspect the findings of the two independent reports. They are selected here as helpful 
for a textual analysis of these secondary sources: they are neither comprehensive for a general 
situation nor indicative of enquiries in the research that is proposed, as that is intended to go 
far more openly and widely into organisational, capability, policy, and political dimensions. 
They are as follows. 
1. The contribution of IT to project objectives. What is the technology for? In central 
government, its crucial role is in enabling the administration of policy and legislation 
(such as collecting taxes or paying benefits). IT also provides tools for the professional 
work of civil servants and general organisational functions (HR, accounting, etc). 
 
2. Project approval and assurance. How does an organisation approve and monitor major 
projects, including their IT components? What are the roles of business cases and 
assurance processes (in UK central government, the HM Treasury and Cabinet Office 
procedures)? 
 
3. Programme and project management. How are programmes and projects defined, 
designed, governed and managed? What standards, methods and toolkits are in use? 
 
4. The acquisition, implementation and operation of IT. How is IT organised, governed, 
managed, procured and implemented? What standards, methods and toolkits are in use? 
 
5. Capability. How are the skills to do all the above acquired and maintained? How is the 
recruitment, management, organisation and deployment of human resources, and 
professional development, all done?  
 
 
The contribution of IT to project objectives 
The Government review of IT projects in 2000 [3] following repeated failures in the 1990s 
determined that government projects like the two examined were the implementation of policy 
and legislation, not “IT projects”. More precisely, they are complex realisations of policy 
instruments executed in an indeterminate political and legislative context [4]. They have 
different characteristics to implementing internal statistical modelling or accounting systems, 
for example. 
Both project reports state or imply that there was a focus in the projects on the technical 
component, particularly the web front-end (a result of the ambition of “digital transformation” 
[4]). Debates about IT procurement and development methods (waterfall vs agile) appear to 
have been intense and contentious, and bled over into the dynamics of the projects as a whole. 
The PAC asserted that this caused a loss of focus on the policy objectives of the CAP-D project, 
and lack of clarity of these was also a reported feature of UC. The review in 2000 established 
that not being clear on what you are trying to achieve (the policy and administrative outcomes 
in this context) is a strong predictor of project failure. 
 
Project approval and assurance 
The role of the business case in a project is significant and its lack of prominence in the reports 
of these cases is noteworthy. HM Treasury (HMT) guidance [5] says that “the business case, 
both as a product and a process, provides decision makers, stakeholders and the public with a 
management tool for evidence based and transparent decision making and a framework for the 
delivery, management and performance monitoring of the resultant scheme”. It must answer 
the questions about the strategic purpose and outcomes, show how the project optimises Value 
for Money — the Economic Case for it— and that it can be delivered successfully — the 
Management Case.  It also underpins project assurance reviews such as Gateways [6].  
The HMT process for approving business cases is well-established [5], but in 2011 a separate 
IT spend control process run within the Cabinet Office (CO) became mandatory for projects 
over a certain financial threshold. This was applied to CAP-D and UC, and both reports say 
that approval was conditional on specific approaches to IT procurement and software 
development being adopted (both derived from web development practice but arguably 
unproven for the specific contexts of these two projects). This separate but powerful influence 
was indicated by the reports to be the root cause of many problems in the projects. 
When there is an optimal solution to a problem as determined by a business case analysis of 
options, any constraint then superimposed on an input to the project (e.g. on IT, personnel, 
location, procurement, implementation methods, or timing) will lead to suboptimal outcomes. 
Both project reports describe approval delays and procurement challenges arising from such 
input constraints. In both cases these alone were highly disruptive, but in any situation they 
would inevitably reduce the benefits of the project relative to the optimal Value for Money of 
the Economic Case. 
Programme and project management 
Both reports state that teams developing the user-facing front end programs (the “digital by 
default”, i.e. web-based, components) were disconnected from, in fact in contention with, those 
working on back-end administrative processes. This indicates a failure of programme and 
project direction and management, and the organisation of technology as a project resource. 
These are scrutinised early in the Gateway Review process and emphasis is placed on getting 
them right, so this process seems no longer to be effective. It should examine whether capable 
people are in those roles, and whether tried and tested programme and project management 
techniques are being used, such as Managing Successful Programmes (MSP) and PRINCE2. 
Their implied absence here raises the question of whether such people and techniques were 
deemed unnecessary for “agile, digital” projects. In both cases, omissions in these regards has 
led to considerable senior management time being spent in resolving issues in the projects. 
There is a clue to the source of some problems in the way the reports discuss the issue of the 
Senior Responsible Owners (SROs). They focus on the high rate of turnover, but what is 
significant is who was in the role and what they thought their role was. The original purpose 
[3] of the SRO role was to provide a firm anchor of overall responsibility for the achievement 
of the benefits intended for the project within the organisation’s core functions, as opposed to 
the project being semi-detached from the mainstream of its work. So typically an SRO would 
be a senior civil servant responsible for the policy or administrative functions within which the 
project lay, giving him or her the highest responsibility and power over the project. A project 
does not “bring in an SRO”: SROs exist in the department, initiate the project, and are not 
separately appointed.  
The implication of the reported facts is that SROs were perceived, and acted, more like 
appointed project directors than owners representing the organisation. That would indicate 
messed-up project governance due to misunderstanding and/or misallocation of key roles.  
Originally, the report from a Gateway Review (part of the Cabinet Office’s major projects 
assurance toolkit [6]) was solely for the SRO as the responsible party. During the life of both 
projects, changes to the process introduced dual reporting, to the Cabinet Office as well as the 
SRO, reflecting the CO’s new monitoring and intervention roles.  This almost certainly changes 
the relationship between project teams being reviewed and the reviewers, with the latter 
potentially being seen as agents of the CO there to check whether the project is complying with 
CO rules. As reported in the independent review reports, participants in the UC project describe 
defensiveness on the part of the project team, and relations appeared to have been acrimonious 
at times in CAP-D. These aspects of the reports point to strategic ownership being absent and 
authority being distributed (the PAC described the Cabinet Office’s position as “power without 
responsibility” [1, Oral Evidence, Q85-Q92]). Both were issues that were addressed by the 
2000 review [3] and the processes subsequently put in place. 
 
 
The acquisition, implementation and operation of IT 
As already set out above, numerous issues are reported as arising in the projects from externally 
directed approaches to IT procurement and the separation of teams working on back end 
processes and web application development. Further, the intention to apply “agile” approaches 
in the projects is revealed, but it is not wholly clear if expectation was for it to be applied solely 
to software development (the origin of the method lies in web application development) or the 
whole project. There is little evidence anywhere that these approaches are applicable beyond 
the scope within which they originated, in particular to policy implementation as opposed to 
web application development. The implication is that confusion reigned over the relationship 
of agile approaches to project management toolkits, like MSP and PRINCE2, and assurance 
processes like Gateways, whereas these each operate at different levels and are largely 
independent of each other. 
 
Capability 
Although some guidance [7] now exists, agile methods and the approach to procurement 
dictated by CO spend controls for these projects were new to government departments, 
according to the independent reports. In both cases a lack of relevant skills is reported as a 
problem. The logic of attempting to do things in a time-critical project using approaches no-
one involved had the knowledge to apply is of course questionable. This is a tactical issue, but 
viewed strategically there is a clear need for professional development in a range of areas. For 
many years the government used the Skills Framework for the Information Age (SFIA) [8] as 
the basis for professional development [9], and SFIA version 6 was designed to embrace any 
skills that might relate to “digital” [10]. At some point after 2011 the established IT Profession 
[9] appears to have been set aside in favour of a new “digital, data and technology” profession 
that so far (based on available published information [11]) focusses narrowly on agile web 
front-end development. This has risked losing the momentum and institutional processes that 
had been established to address the very problems being encountered and the great breadth of 
capability required. 
 
Conclusion and research objectives 
The conclusion from this analysis of two project reports is not that all UK projects involving 
IT or “digital” would experience such problems. However, the post-2010 changes are 
embedded into the government system for managing projects. They have unwittingly, but of 
course with positive intentions, introduced perturbations into one or more elements of 
established processes and created incoherence and conflict within that system. They apply to 
governance and the higher levels of project management and assurance, mostly relating to the 
functions and directives of the Cabinet Office, including the Government Digital Service. They 
have significantly damaged the implementation of government projects and the two reports 
reveal that measures intended to save money have already cost the country hundreds of millions 
of pounds.  
A reset, to use the Cabinet Office’s term applied to the projects reviewed, is therefore needed, 
and Brunel’s proposed research aims to assist that as expeditiously as possible. 
Accordingly, the research study objectives will be to:  
1) Develop a new Critical Success Factor (CSF) matrix through a focused and systematic 
review of academic and grey literature to conceptualise IT-enabled policy 
implementation projects within government  
2) Map CSFs of such government projects using interpretive structural modelling (ISM) 
to identify and evaluate the interrelationships and interdependencies between the CSFs 
and their impact on project success 
3) Create guidelines based on the validated CSF matrix and lessons learnt, targeted 
towards policy makers, IT managers and scholars. 
 
References 
1. House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts (2016). The Common Agricultural 
Policy Delivery Programme. Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2015–16. 
2. Timmins, N. (2016). Universal Credit: from disaster to recovery? Institute for 
Government, London. 
3. Cabinet Office (2000). Successful IT – modernising Government in action. HM 
Government, London. 
4. Waller, P. and Weerakkody, V. (2016). Digital Government: overcoming the systemic 
failure of transformation. Brunel University London Working Paper. 
5. HM Treasury (2013). The Green Book: appraisal and evaluation in central 
government. HM Government, London. 
6. Cabinet Office (2015). Major Projects Authority: assurance toolkit. HM Government, 
London. 
7. HM Treasury (2015). Agile digital and IT projects: clarification of business case 
guidance. HM Government, London. 
8. SFIA Foundation (2013). Skills Framework for the Information Age. 
9. HM Government (2011). Government ICT Capability Strategy. 
10. SFIA Foundation (2013). Moving to SFIA version 6. 
11. HM Government (2016). Digital, data and technology professions. 
 
 
 About the Author 
 
Vishanth Weerakkody is a Professor of Digital Governance at Brunel University 
London. Prior to his academic career, Vishanth worked in a number of 
Multinational organisations in the area of software engineering, business systems 
design and process analysis. He is currently involved in several R&D projects 
which are funded by the European Commission (Live City: http://www.livecity-
psp.eu/; PolicyCompass: http://policycompass.eu/; DAREED: 
http://www.dareed.eu/: SI-DRIVE: http://www.sidrive. eu/; EMPATIA: 
http://empatia-project.eu/) and other international bodies such as the Qatar 
Foundation (I-MEET: http://www.brunel.ac.uk/bbs/research/research-success/i-meet) focusing on 
themes such as Smart Cities, ICT enabled process transformation, social innovation and digital 
inclusion in the public sector. He has published over 150 peer reviewed articles, guest-edited special 
issues of leading journals and edited several books on these themes. Vishanth has many years of R&D 
experience in the field of ICT innovation, process transformation and digital governance and is currently 
the Editor-in-Chief of the International Journal of Electronic Government Research. A Chartered IT 
professional and a Fellow of the UK Higher Education Academy, he combines over 25 years of practical 
industry-based knowhow with academic and teaching experience. 
 
